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CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DUE PROCESS-CHANGE OF
VENUE-PRETRIAL PUBLICITY-The Superior Court of Pennsylvania
has held, sub silentio, that juror prejudice may be presumed and
that a change of venue may be required to overcome the effects of
pretrial publicity even when such publicity is not inherently preju-
dicial.
Commonwealth v. Casper, 375 A.2d 737 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977),
rev'd, 392 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1978).
William Casper was tried before a jury in 1975 in the Court of
Common Pleas of Butler County on charges of macing,' extortion,
conspiracy, and solicitation. Prior to trial he filed an Application for
a Change of Venue' claiming that intense local publicity precluded
the possibility of a fair trialin Butler County.3 The publicity consis-
ted of twenty-four newspaper stories in which Casper's name ap-
peared at least thirty-six times.' At the time of indictment, he was
well-known throughout the community because of his position as
chairman of the Democrat Party of Butler County. 5 The requested
venue change was denied and Casper was subsequently convicted.
On appeal,7 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in a 5-1 decision
stated that the breadth of the publicity in this case was such that
it was impossible for Casper to receive a fair trial in Butler County
and that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to grant a
change of venue.' The court made specific findings that the nature
1. The charges involved the solicitation of political campaign contributions in violation
of the Pennsylvania Anti-Macing Act, which provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any political committee, .. to demand from any public officer
[or] subordinate, ... any assessment or percentage of any money or profit, or their
equivalent in any thing of value, with the understanding, express or implied, that the
same may be used or shall be used for political purposes ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2374 (Purdon 1963).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 551 (Purdon 1964), allows the granting of a change of venue
at the discretion of the trial judge whenever it appears that prejudicial pretrial publicity will
prevent the defendant from receiving a fair trial.
3. Commonwealth v. Casper, 375 A.2d 737, 739 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977), rev'd, 392 A.2d 287
(Pa. 1978).
4. Id. For illustrations of the nature of the publicity, see note 48 infra.
5. Id. at 738. He was also the state treasurer of the Democratic Party. Butler Eagle, May
16, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
6. 375 A.2d at 739.
7. Id. at 738.
8. Id. at 743. In Pennsylvania, the granting of a change of venue is discretionary. See note
2 supra. However, the trial judge's decision may be reversed if an abuse of discretion is found.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Swanson, 432 Pa. 293, 296, 248 A.2d 12, 14 (1968).
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and extent of the publicity was substantial, that the accused was a
well-known local public figure prior to the publicity and that the
publicity took place in a small community where its effect would be
magnified.' The case was remanded to the court below with direc-
tions to grant the change of venue and order a new trial. 0
President Judge Watkins, writing the majority opinion in Casper,
replied primarily on the United States Supreme Court decision in
Rideau v. Louisiana" and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deci-
sions in Commonwealth v. Pierce'" and Commonwealth v. Hoss.13
From Rideau, he extracted the principle that juror prejudice can be
presumed from the extent and nature of the pretrial publicity.'
Rideau was also read as holding that the size of the locale must be
considered when analyzing the effects of the publicity. 5 The court
cited Pierce as authority for the proposition that the source of the
publicity is important in determining its effect on prospective ju-
rors. I From Hoss, which distinguished Rideau, the court concluded
that publicity has more effect in smaller communities.' 7 The major-
9. 375 A.2d at 743.
10. Id. Judge Hoffman concurred in the result and Judge Price dissented, each without
opinion. The Commonwealth's request for allocatur was granted, No. 264, March Term, 1977,
and the superior court was reversed.
11. 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (change of venue granted because a filmed interview of defen-
dant's confession to murder broadcast over television in community where trial took place
was considered prejudicial to defendant).
12. 451 Pa. 190, 303 A.2d 209 (change of venue granted because newspaper accounts of
confession and staged reenactment of crime were considered prejudicial to defendant), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
13. 445 Pa. 98, 283 A.2d 58 (1971) (change of venue denied because most of publicity was
factual in nature).
. 14. 375 A.2d at 740. Rideau, however, may also be read as being strictly limited to its
factual setting of televised confessions. If so, it is not clear that changes of venue are constitu-
tionally required in cases involving other types of pretrial publicity. See Note, The Efficacy
of a Change of Venue in Protecting a Defendant's Right to an Impartial Jury, 42 NoTRE DAME
LAw. 925, 940 (1967).
15. 375 A.2d at 740. Rideau did make reference to the size of the locale, but only for
purposes of illustrating how many persons in the community were exposed to the publicity
in comparison to the number of persons residing in the community and not for the reason
specified by the Casper court. 373 U.S. at 724.
16. 375 A.2d at 740-41. In Pierce, the court was troubled with the fact that the source of
the prejudicial publicity was the police. The concern seemed to be that potential jurors would
pay great heed to and be more apt to be prejudiced as to defendant's guilt when the publicity
emanated from such sources. 451 Pa. at 198, 303 A.2d at 214.
17. 375 A.2d at 741. Although Hoss is cited for this proposition there is no discussion of it
anywhere in the opinion. However, other jurisdictions consider the size of the community
relevant in gauging the impact of the publicity. See, e.g., In re Miller, 33 Cal. 3d 1005, 109
Cal. Rptr. 648 (1973) (size of community is a factor to be considered in determining whether
ity interpreted these precedents to require courts to consider four
factors in deciding whether to grant changes of venue based on
adverse pretrial publicity: the nature and extent of the publicity,
the source of the publicity, and the nature of the locale affected by
the publicity. 8 The majority noted in addition that here the defen-
dant was a well-known public figure prior to the news reports linking
him to the macing scheme. 9 Believing that well-known persons are
particularly vulnerable to news accounts of alleged wrongdoing,2
the court declared that a fifth factor had to be added: the extent of
the public's familiarity with the defendant's name prior to the news
accounts of his alleged illegal activities.2' In applying these factors
to cases involving change of venue petitions, the court stressed that
not all of them need be present before a change of venue is man-
dated, but that any factor or combination of factors may be suffi-
cient to make a change of venue necessary for the defendant to
receive a fair trial.12 The clear implication of this is that the Casper
court considered no single factor to be indispensable.U
Historically, to obtain a change of venue, the defendant had the
burden of showing identifiable juror prejudice through voir dire ex-
amination." However, in the landmark decision of Rideau v.
Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court held that juror preju-
dice need not always be shown, but may be presumed depending on
change of venue is proper); Johnson v. State, 467 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App.) (population
of community was over one million persons in contrast to other cases where widespread
publicity in a sparsely settled county required a change of venue), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951
(1971); Ferber, Beating Bad Press: Protecting the California Criminal Defendant from Ad-
verse Publicity, 10 U.S.F.L. REv. 391 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Ferber].
18. 375 A.2d at 741.
19. Id. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
20. 375 A.2d at 741.
21. Id. at 743. No reference to any express authority was made for this new proposition.
The court did, however, allude to a prior dissent of Judge Watkins from which the proposition
seems to have been developed. See Commonwealth v. Evans, 190 Pa. Super. Ct. 179, 280,
154 A.2d 57, 108 (1959) (Watkins, J., dissenting).
California also considers the status of the defendant to be a relevant criterion. See In re
Miller, 33 Cal. 3d 1005, 109 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1973) (status of the defendant in the community
is a factor to be considered in determining whether change of venue is proper); Maine v.
Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 375, 438 P.2d 372, 66 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1968) (where defendants are
friendless and victims are prominent, change of venue may be necessary to assure a fair trial);
Ferber, supra note 17, at 399.
22. 375 A.2d at 743.
23. See notes 38-45 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the significance of this
aspect of the decision.
24. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (defendant must rebut the presump-
tion of impartiality).
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the nature of the pretrial publicity." The Court did not establish a
general standard for when juror prejudice may be presumed, but
declared that the televised interview in which Rideau confessed to
murder was, in a real sense, his trial and that any subsequent pro-
ceedings in the local community would be a hollow formality."
In Pennsylvania, the test for presumed juror prejudice was devel-
oped in Commonwealth v. Pierce.27 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court said that identifiable prejudice generally must be shown by
voir dire examination of the prospective jurors.8 However, to come
within the Rideau guidelines, the court stated that if the publicity
were inherently prejudicial, the defendant would not be required to
show a nexus between it and actual jury prejudice to be entitled to
a change of venue.2 The Pierce court concluded that the publicity,
which included newspaper accounts of a confession and a staged
reenactment of the crime, clearly pointed to Pierce's guilt; hence,
it was inherently prejudicial. 30 The court mentioned that any pro-
spective juror exposed to this publicity must have formed a definite
opinion as to Pierce's guilt or innocence. 31
In Commonwealth v. Hoss,32 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
upheld a denial of a change of venue because the publicity therein
did not approach the dimensions of that in Rideau. The court found
that the pretrial publicity did not taint the community of 1/2
million people so as to make a fair trial impossible. 33 In analyzing
Hoss in Casper, Judge Watkins inferred that the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court had found a change of venue was not required by
distinguishing Rideau on the basis of the relatively small (150,000
25. 373 U.S. at 727. The publicity in Rideau was a filmed interview of the defendant's
confession to murder while being interrogated in jail. The interview was broadcast over local
television on three occasions.
26. Id. at 726. Rideau has been interpreted as saying that if the information is prejudicial
and the dissemination widespread in the community from which the jury is drawn, the
defendant is entitled to relief. See United States ex rel. Doggett v. Yeager, 472 F.2d 229, 238
(3d Cir. 1973).
27. 451 Pa. 190, 303 A.2d 209 (1973).
28. Id. at 195, 303 A.2d at 212.
29. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Nahodil, 462 Pa. 301, 306, 341 A.2d 91, 93 (1975) ("It
must also appear that the news accounts were so. 'inherently prejudicial' that the possibility
of a fair trial was questionable.").
30. 451 Pa. at 196, 303 A.2d at 213.
31. Id.
32. 445 Pa. at 105, 283 A.2d at 62.
33. 445 Pa. at 106, 283 A.2d at 63.
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people) population involved in Rideau." This difference in Hoss
made it less likely that the defendant would be denied a fair trial
because the effects of the publicity would tend to be diffused in a
highly populated area.3 Conversely, in Casper, the court believed
that the publicity would have a substantial effect because Butler
County has a population of only 128 ,000.-
The principal issue in Casper was whether the trial judge abused
his discretion by refusing to grant a change in venue in the face of
widespread pretrial publicity allegedly sufficient to raise the pre-
sumption of juror prejudice. In resolving this question, the court
held that the five factors previously discussed should have been
considered by the trial court when it ruled on the change of venue
petition. 37 If the opinion had gone no further, it would probably be
of limited significance as little more than a restatement of prior case
law. The critical importance of Casper, however, is that it appears
to eliminate the requirement that, in the absence of juror prejudice
identified through voir dire, the publicity must be shown to be
inherently prejudicial in order to mandate a change of venue. The
court impliedly did this when it stated that the presence of any of
the five factors alone 'might be sufficient to require a change of
venue.
38
The Casper decision thus viewed is contrary to the settled law in
Pennsylvania regarding change of venue. The court in Pierce
stressed that the inherently prejudicial nature of the publicity was
the very basis for its decision that the defendant did not have the
burden of showing identifiable juror prejudice.3 This requirement
34. 375 A.2d at 741. Although the Hoss opinion made reference to the size of the com-
munity it did not distinguish Rideau on that basis. Rather it focused on the nature of the
publicity which it described as factual, instead of prejudicial as in Rideau. 445 Pa. at 104-
06, 283 A.2d at 62-63.
35. 375 A.2d at 741. See note 17 supra for further discussion of this matter.
36. 375 A.2d at 741.
37. Id. at 743. See notes 18-21 and accompanying text supra.
38. If any one factor is sufficient to mandate a change of venue, it is clear that the
requirement of inherently prejudicial publicity is no longer viable. In framing its holding, the
court said:
It is not necessary that all of the above elements be present before a change of venue
is mandated in order to insure a fair trial. Any element set forth above or any combina-
tion of the above elements may be sufficient to make a change of venue necessary in
order to insure that the defendant receives a fair trial.
375 A.2d at 743.
39. The court stated: "We hold that the nature of the accounts released by the police were
so 'inherently prejudicial' that Pierce need not have shown a nexus between the publicity and
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was reaffirmed in Commonwealth v. Nahodil.10 In addition, where
the pretrial publicity has been primarily factual rather than inflam-
matory or inherently prejudicial, courts in many jurisdictions, in-
cluding Pennsylvania, have uniformly held that a change of venue
is not required." Furthermore, widespread publicity alone does not
appear sufficient to compel a change of venue. 2 In Commonwealth
v. Powell,3 a change of venue was refused," the court recognizing
that extensive pretrial publicity does not necessarily preclude a fair
trial."5
actual jury prejudice, and hence, he did not have the burden of showing identifiable preju-
dice." 451 Pa. at 195, 303 A.2d at 212.
40. 462 Pa. 301, 306, 341 A.2d 91, 93 (1975) (change of venue denied in murder trial
because publicity was wholly lacking in inflammatory content). Accord, Commonwealth v.
Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 275, 361 A.2d 282, 288 (1976) (despite reports from "unidentified"
officials that defendant had confessed to murder, change of venue was denied because, al-
though the publicity was prejudicial, it was not inherently prejudicial); Commonwealth v.
Russell, 459 Pa. 1, 6, 326 A.2d 303, 305 (1974) (change of venue denied because the publicity
was limited to factual reporting and, unlike that in Pierce, was not inherently prejudicial).
See also United States ex rel. Doggett v. Yeager, 472 F.2d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 1973); American
Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice: Standards Relating to
Fair Trial and Free Press, Approved Draft § 3.2 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA Project].
Because of the concept of presumed juror prejudice, a juror's assurances of impartiality
despite exposure to prejudicial publicity are not dispositive of the accused's rights with regard
to petitions for change of venue. Ranney, Remedies for Prejudicial Publicity: A Brief Review,
21 VILL. L. REv. 819, 821 (1976).
41. See People v. Nye, 63 Cal. 2d 166, 170, 403 P.,2d 736, 738, 45 Cal. Rptr. 328, 332 (1965)
(change of venue in murder trial denied because publicity was factual and fair to both sides),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1026 (1966); People v. Myers, 35 Il1. 2d 311, 326, 220 N.E.2d 297, 308
(1966) (change of venue in murder trial denied because media coverage was done in an
objective manner), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1019 (1967); Commonwealth v. Swanson, 432 Pa.
293, 299, 248 A.2d 12, 16 (1968) (change of venue in murder trial denied because the publicity,
which included 30 newspaper articles and 45 television newscasts, was factual), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 949 (1969). See also 1 C. ToRciA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 43 (12th ed.
1974).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Mesarosh, 223 F.2d 449, 458 (3d Cir. 1955) (change of venue
in conspiracy trial denied because, although the publicity was widespread, it was no different
than the type accorded others who make the news), rev'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 1 (1956).
See also Commonwealth v. Swanson, 432 Pa. 293, 248 A.2d 12 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
949 (1969).
43. 459 Pa. 253, 328 A.2d 507 (1974) (change of venue denied because reporting was
factual, not inflammatory).
44. Id. at 259, 328 A.2d at 510.
45. In fact, there is authority for the proposition that jurors who are totally uninformed
about the facts in the case they are to hear are not necessarily as desirable as those who have
some prior knowledge of the surrounding circumstances. As early as 1874 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court stated:
[W]e must stand abreast with the present age, when every remarkable event of today
is known all over the country tomorrow, and exclude those only whose opinions are so
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Curiously, the Casper court made a specific finding that the na-
ture and extent of the pretrial publicity was great,16 which may be
read as equivalent to saying that the publicity was inherently preju-
dicial. This is doubtful, however, since the requirements of Pierce
and its progeny would have been satisfied at that point, and the
court would have had no need to establish the new test.7 Assuming,
then, that the publicity in Casper did not measure up to the Pierce
standard, the court may have simply thought a more liberal rule
should apply when a public figure is involved. It is reasonable to
draw this inference because, although it was extensive, the publicity
in Casper would probably not be considered inflammatory enough
to be classified as inherently prejudicial."
In establishing the requirement that trial judges must consider
the familiarity of the accused's name to the local populace when
determining whether pretrial publicity necessitates a change of
venue, the superior court has made a valuable contribution to this
area. of the law. The court's hypothesis, that in instances involving
criminal charges against public figures the effect of such publicity
is magnified,"1 appears reasonable. However, in framing the ulti-
mate holding as it did, the court has confused matters by apparently
fixed as to be prejudgments, or have been formed upon the [personally] known evi-
dence in the cause. . . . [I1f we lag behind we must commit the trial of the most
important causes in life to those, so ignorant, their dark minds have never been smitten
by the rays of intelligence.
O'Mara v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. 424, 428 (1874), quoted in ABA Project, supra note 40, at
60.
46. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
47. See notes 29 & 39 and accompanying text supra.
48. See note 4 and accompanying text supra. The following examples of newspaper ac-
counts in the Butler Eagle are representative of those appearing prior to Casper's trial: May
16, 1974, "Casper, 7 Penn DOT Employees Charged With Macing"; December 2, 1974, Quote
from Assistant District Attorney Alexander Lindsay, "The charges are merely allegations that
must be approved by an indicting grand jury before the cases could go to trial"; February
19, 1975, "Casper on Trial." The following cases contain examples of publicity declared to
be prejudicial: Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 338, 339 (1966) (headlines stressing defen-
dant's lack of cooperation with the police, and reenactment of the crime before police and
newsmen); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 311 (1959) (newspaper accounts of defen-
dant's prior crminal activity reached jurors); Forsythe v. State, 12 Ohio Misc. 99, 101 (C.P.
1967) (newspapers referred to the defendant as "ex con" and "vice figure"); Commonwealth
v. Brado, 470 Pa. 306, 307, 368 A.2d 643, 644 (1977) (a newspaper article at time of jury
selection was highly critical of the intoxication defense on which defendant intended to rely).
But see Commonwealth v. Swanson, 432 Pa. 293, 299, 248 A.2d 12, 16 (1968) (change of venue
refused despite references to defendant as a "punk, arrogant person" because the bulk of the
other publicity was factual in nature), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 949 (1969).
49. 375 A.2d at 741.
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abrogating the inherently prejudicial requirement which has been
the basis for requiring a venue change in the'absence of voir dire5
The Casper court should have held that where a public figure is
involved it takes less prejudicial publicity to raise the presumption
of juror prejudice. This would have allowed the court to achieve its
apparent objective of establishing a more liberal standard for
changes of venue when the defendant is a public figure, while at the
same time providing a result consistent with the dictates of Pierce.
However, in the wake of Casper, it is for the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court to either retain the inherently prejudicial requirement and
thereby reaffirm the vitality of Pierce, or to embark on the perilous
road of Casper.51
Edward T. Morriss
50. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
51. Casper was reversed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 392 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1978).
